The role of the Kenya red-cross society in addressing the humanitarian crisis of internally displaced persons in Uasin-Gishu County

Shadrack Kipkoech Sitienei[1], Dr. Thomas Otieno Juma[2]
[1-2] PhD Candidate - Political Science, Moi University, Kenya

Abstract
The study endeavored to assess the role of the Kenya Red-Cross Society in addressing the plight of Internally Displaced Persons as a result of 2007/8 PEV in Uasin-Gishu County, Kenya. Intra-state conflict and the resultant internal displacement is one of the greatest challenges facing the Globe today. However, despite international actors and legal mechanisms being in place, the IDP still face many challenges. The study assessed the role of the Red Cross society in addressing the plight of Internally Displaced Persons, being tackled from relevant sub-themes. The study used a survey research design. It became evident that; enough has not been done in addressing the plight of the displaced population, profiling of Internally Displaced Population was marred with corruption, and that the provision of Non-Food Items was a challenge.

Keywords: internal displacement/intervention/humanitarianism/red-cross society

1. Introduction
2. Background of the study
The issue of humanitarian assistance is gaining prominence continually with the increase in cases of population displacement world over. According to the UNHCR statistical report 2009, there were approximately 43 million forcibly displaced people. It is estimated that around 15 million of these were refugees, 27 million were internally displaced persons (IDPs), and about 1 million were asylum seekers. Clearly, these numbers combine a massive category of persons under the common term of forcibly displaced, and they have been described as unprotected and stateless, alienated from their normal government or society, involuntarily forced to flee, and unable to return to their home area (Schacknove, 1985, Martin, 1999, Haddad, 2004) [19, 16, 5].
The world's 27 million internally displaced persons, spread throughout about fifty countries, are the orphans of conflict. These individuals have been driven from their homes by conflict, human rights abuses, ethnic cleansing campaigns, and natural disasters, and stay within their own country's borders. Countries with estimates of at least one million IDPs include Sudan, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda, Iraq, Algeria, and Turkey. There has been a drastic increase in the numbers of internally displaced persons since the end of the Cold War, with a 50-percent rise in the number of IDPs since 1989 (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center Quarterly Report, July-September 2013). The ebb and flow of conflict has resulted in some new names appearing on the list of countries facing major displacement (including Algeria, Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Uganda, and Zimbabwe), increases in already heavily affected countries (especially Sudan, where about 2 million people have been displaced in the Darfur region, Colombia, Iraq, Somalia, and Nepal), and some improvements with the restoration of stability and resettlement of IDPs in others (Global IDP project, 2005).

Since 1998, the Norwegian refugee council's internal displacement monitoring center has monitored internal displacement resulting from conflict and violence across the world. In 2011, the number of people internally displaced by these causes stood at 26.4 million (Forced migration supplement, 2012).
In 2011, Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDCM) monitored internal displacement in 21 Sub-Saharan African countries. There were an estimated 9.7 million IDPs in these countries, representing over a third of the world's total population of internal displacement. Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Somalia continued to be the countries with the largest internally displaced person in Africa.
Violent struggles between groups fighting for access to natural resources, land and political representation and power were among the root causes of most of these displacements. These struggles were manifested either by armed conflicts pitting governments and their armed forces against armed opposition groups, or by inter-communal violence.
While governments or associated armed groups were the main agents of displacement in the majority of situations, the role of armed opposition groups in forcing people to flee was significant. Armed criminal groups also caused displacement especially in areas where government security forces had little capacity to combat banditry.
In the same year, as in previous years, elections were a context of new displacement. A significant number of people remained internally displaced for eight years after election related violence in Kenya, while presidential elections in cote d'voire, Nigeria and DRC led to internal displacement during the year (UN refugee agency for internally displaced persons figures 2010-2013).
Despite the overall decline in refugee numbers, massive new displacements were reported in a number of countries. In cote

d'voire, up to a million people were displaced by fighting which followed the presidential elections of late 2010. Some 350,000 people were newly displaced by inter-communal violence in southern Sudan, and at least 165,000 by the ongoing conflicts and violence in Eastern areas of DRC, Somalia and Sudan. Other countries in Africa which saw displacement in 2011 include the Central African republic (CAR), Kenya and Nigeria (www.idpreview.org).

In West Africa, disputed elections accassioned massive displacement in 2011. In Cote d'voire, after both Alessane Outtara and Laurent Gbagbo claimed victory in December 2010, a battle for national control between their respective supporters caused a four months wave of new displacement. In Nigeria, violence which broke out after the results of the presidential elections were released led to the displacement of some 65,000 people across the northern states ((UN refugee agency for internally displaced persons figures 2010-2013). In both countries, internal displacement also followed inter-communal disputes over land and access to economic and political power, and attacks by non-state armed groups.

Sudan was Africa's largest country until July 2011, when it divided into two with the independence of Southern Sudan. While the separation itself was relatively peaceful, subsequent outbreaks of violence in the South Sudan states of unity, upper Nile and Jouglei, in the disputed border area of Abyei, and in Somalia 's southern kordofa and Blue Nile states, all led to large-scale displacement. Although the citizenship status of 700,000 Southerners living in Khartoum remained to be determined, the combined internally displaced population of the two still made for the largest internal displacement situation in Africa at the end of 2011 (www.unhcr.org).

DRC remained the country with most IDPs on the continent after Sudan. In Eastern Congo, attacks by armed groups and military operations against them continued to cause the displacement of tens of thousands of people in 2011. Incursion into Northern Kenya by armed groups from Ethiopia and Somalia also caused new displacement, while the subsequent entry of Kenya defense forces into southern Somalia reportedly led to further displacement as people fled in fear of fighting between the Kenya defense force in Somalia and Al-shabab forces.

There was also localized displacement in Ethiopia and northern Kenya as ethnic groups fought for access to scarce resources. In the 1992 and 1997 general elections respectively, Kenya witnessed violence though in lower intensity compared with 2007/2008 post-election violence. It is estimated that during the violence that ensued in 2007/8, 1,133 lives were lost, 78,254 houses were destroyed country wide and some 663,921 people were displaced. Out of the 663,921, it is estimated that about 350,000 people sought refuge in 118 camps, 313,921 were integrated amongst various communities in the country while 640 households fled to Uganda (KNHRC, 2008). It is also estimated that economic and business losses were in excess of Kshs. 100 billion.

Population displacement always leaves the victims vulnerable to humanitarian crisis. It is, therefore, against the foregoing background that this study set out to assess the role of the Kenya Red Cross society in addressing the humanitarian crisis of the internally displaced persons as a result of 2007/8 post-election violence in Kenya.

3. Statement of the problem
Violent conflicts in developing countries like Kenya have led to serious loss in lives, loss of properties, intercommunity squabbles, and in the end leading to IDPs and other forms of human immigrations. As a result of these, the clarity of the bodies concerned with attending to the plight of IDPs has been a real dilemma. The Red Cross Society and other organizations globally have been very active in ameliorating humanitarian crisis. Looking at the Kenyan situation in the aftermath of the 2007/8 election violence there seems to be no clarity in the role especially of the Kenya Red Cross Society.

The majority of IDPs resulting from the numerous displacements in Kenya have not been resettled and their lives restored. The lack of a mechanism to ensure a durable solution to protect IDPs and to restore their lives ensuring that they do not suffer any discrimination has been at the root of the failure by the government to fully resettle victims of the many cycles of displacement in Kenya since independence. The primary responsibility for protecting IDPs and all persons within their own country rests with the national authorities of the country. Moreover, it is sometimes the very governments responsible for protecting and assisting the internally displaced persons that are unable or even unwilling to do so, and in some cases, may even be directly involved in forcibly uprooting civilians. Due to inability or unwillingness of the states to contain political violence, the number of IDPs is increasing at an alarming rate in Africa. It is from this understanding that the researchers sought to find out if there are government policies in Kenya towards the plight of internally displaced persons.

The government of Kenya in January 2008 appointed the Kenya Red Cross society to be the lead coordinating agency for humanitarian assistance to victims of humanitarian crisis. With the IDPs still lingering in camps, did the Kenya Red Cross Society succeed in its mandate? The question of human rights situation of the IDPs is a focus of study given that displacement interferes with people's habitation. Nearly seven years after displacement, there are internally displaced persons living in tents and are still facing humanitarian crisis in Kenya. In undertaking their duty as a lead agency, the study assesses the challenges encountered by the KRCS in addressing humanitarian crisis (shelter, food, healthcare, security) and additionally seeks to highlight solutions to these challenges of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) in Kenya using Uasin-Gishu County as a case study.

4. Justification of the study
The number of internally displaced persons facing humanitarian crisis is increasing at an alarming rate in sub-Sahara Africa (IDMC, 2009), consequently affecting socio-economic development. This calls for an empirical study on the role of the Kenya Red-Cross Society in offering humanitarian aid to the suffering population in the displaced camps especially in Uasin-Gishu County which registered a heavy presence of IDPs, and the efforts put in place to ensure that such triggers of violence do not recur. The study is expected to form the basis for further research on the role of Red-Cross and other relevant agencies in addressing the humanitarian crisis of the internally displaced and the emerging issues in both forced migration and international relations. The results of the study will be used by the

international, regional and local actors concerned with population displacement.

5. Conceptual framework

Miles and Huberman (1994) [8] defined a conceptual framework as a visual or written product, one that "explains, either graphically or in narrative form, the main things to be studied— the key factors, concepts, or variables— and the presumed relationships among them". In underscoring that humanitarian assistance towards IDPs cannot be a sole responsibility of a single international organization or one actor (Monyani, Ndege, and Juma, 2013) [17], it cannot be construed that Red Cross Society of Kenya can succeed on this alone.

Haynes (2010) [6], notes that assistance to and protection of the internally displaced is more than an emergency and Cohen *et al* (1998) rightly states that emergency assistance and protection are the only first stages of response in dealing with internal displacement. This therefore means that the issue of internal displacement in the Kenyan case, need to be handled beyond emergency assistance. To this Lang *et al* (2008) [15] imply the necessity of policies by actors involved like the Kenya Red Cross society, government of Kenya and other humanitarian organizations. This concerted effort will lead to required outcomes like monetary, non-monetary, food, security, and other outcomes (collision, 2003) necessary to IDPs well- being.

The conceptual framework in this study spells out how the Red Cross Society of Kenya, other humanitarian organizations, and the government take complementing roles in humanitarian assistance. Haynes (2010) [6], suggests that protracted internal displacement of persons poses a significant risk to human development, requiring multi-actoral approach.

Many scholars analysis of humanitarian assistance have used the DFID model to relate its efficacy in different environments. Collisons (2003) and Conway (1992) [2], highlights the interrelationship between humanitarian assistance to IDPs in terms of a structure of capital assets, livelihood strategies, and livelihood outcomes which culminates into a desired well-being taking into consideration impediments (vulnerability contexts).

Whereas there is a very good case for assistance, collaboration to IDPs among different actors, there still remains an important role to be played by local assistance managers (in this case the Kenya red cross society) in aid delivery structure. The uncertain relation to local organizations is exacerbated by the difficulty the international humanitarian agencies have had to establish a presence in particular parts of the country (www.sida.se). Whereas external agencies have to come in early stages of involvement the agencies have concentrated on the delivery of the programme, to the detriment of contextual analysis.

The conceptual framework here shows the relationship between the variables under the study. The independent variable in this study is the Kenya Red-Cross Society while the internally displaced persons are the dependent variable. The government of Kenya and other humanitarian organizations represent the intervening variable.

The success of the Red-Cross Society in coordinating humanitarian assistance for the Internally Displaced depends on the political will of the government. The Primary responsibility for protecting internally displaced persons and all persons within their own country rests with the national authorities of the country (*The Brookings Institution-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 2005*). National responsibility is a core concept of any response to internal displacement. It is a fundamental operating principle of the international community and is routinely emphasized by governments themselves, as a function of their sovereignty.

Yet, it is sometimes the very governments responsible for protecting and assisting their internally displaced populations that are unable or even unwilling to do so, and might even be directly involved in forcibly uprooting civilians (ibid). In this conceptual framework, the state/government of Kenya realized its inadequacies' and appointed the Red Cross Society as a lead agency in coordinating humanitarian assistance to IDPs during the 2007/8 post-election violence. The government and other humanitarian agencies channeled their assistance through the Kenya Red Cross Society. Hence the government played a double role, the intervening variable by providing conducive environment for the Red Cross Society to reach the victims of humanitarian crisis and delegating its functions to Red Cross.

6. Role of KRCS in responding to humanitarian crisis

The role of the Red Cross society can be traced to its founder Henry Dunant. In June 1859, Dunant was on his way to meet the French Emperor Napoleon II on business matters. Close to the village of Solferino, Dunant watched the French and Austrian armies clash in a bloody slaughter, in which thousands were killed and wounded in the battle. He changed his course and turned a church in the village of Castiglione into a makeshift hospital and begun organising for help. He even took messages for the victims' families. Back in Geneva, Dunant wrote a book about his experience, which ends with two proposals: To set up in every country national societies for purposes of having care given to the wounded in wartime by volunteers, and to get the states to adopt an international agreement to form the basis for societies for the relief of the wounded (Dulles, 1950). His actions led to the formation of the Red Cross Movement in which it has grown overtime and has branches worldwide.

The Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS) is a humanitarian relief organization created in 1965 through an Act of Parliament, Cap 256 of the Laws of Kenya. As a voluntary organization, the Society operates through a network of eight Regions and 64 Branches spread throughout the country. The Society is a member of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the largest humanitarian relief Movement represented in 189 countries worldwide. Its mission is to be the leading humanitarian organization in Kenya that is self-sustaining, delivering excellent quality service of preventing and alleviating human suffering to the most vulnerable in the community (KRCS, 2015).

The Kenya Red Cross Society's mandate is broadly classified into three major operational areas. These are: Disaster Preparedness and Response Department: This includes Disaster Preparedness, Disaster Response, Tracing services and logistics. Health and Social Services Department: This includes First Aid, Blood Donation, HIV/AIDS, Water and Sanitation (WatSan), Disease Prevention and Control and Social Services. Organizational Development Department: This includes Youth Programmes and Branch Development, the networks through which the Kenya Red Cross carries out its mandate. In 2007/08 when post-elections violence broke out the government of Kenya appointed the Kenya Red Cross Society as a lead agency to

coordinate humanitarian assistance to the victims of humanitarian crisis. The research therefore seeks to assess whether the organization fulfilled its appointed mandate (KRCS, 2008).

6.1 KRCS Fulfillment of mandate

The research started by inquiring from the government of Kenya officials why the government of Kenya appointed Kenya Red Cross Society and not any other organization to coordinate humanitarian assistance.

6.2.1 Why GOK selected KRCS to respond to plight of IDPs

On the above issue, the respondents had multiple responses; however the researchers has re-grouped the responses which are part of the guiding principles of the Red Cross Society Humanity, Independence, Impartiality, Neutrality, Voluntary, Unity and Universality. From table 6, it is clear that Red Cross Society was chosen by the government because of: guiding principles 8(38.1%) experience in handling humanitarian assistance 2(9.5%), resource mobilization capacity 7(33.3%) and established staff 4(19.0%).

Table 1: Response on why the GOK appointed KRCS by KRCS officials

		Responses		
		N	Percent	Percent of Cases
Reason why KRCS was Selected	Red Cross-Principles			
	(Humanity, Independent, Impartiality, Neutrality, Voluntary, Unity and Universality)	8	38.1%	80.0%
	Handling human conflict	2	9.5%	20.0%
	Resource mobilization Capacity	7	33.3%	70.0%
	Established staff	4	19.0%	40.0%
Total		21	100.0%	210.0%

Source: Research Data, 2014

From the table above, the Red Cross Officials gave the following reasons as to why they were chosen; principles of organization, expertise, matching mandate, resource mobilization ability, effectiveness, and their suitability in coordination. From this, therefore, the main reason as to why they were chosen by the government ranks the mentioned reasons on the basis of analysis as follows; Expertise and Resource mobilization/calling for appeal tie at 33.3%, whereas the other reasons share the remaining percentage equally.

The above results from the field are supported by the Red Cross Society Preliminary Appeal No. 1/2008 on IDPs funding affirms that, 'the Kenya Red Cross had put in place an election contingency plan prior to the elections, with over 500 trained staff and volunteers on high alert throughout the country. Over 40 land cruisers and 50 trucks are on standby'.

Table 7: Response on why KRCS was chosen by GoK Officials

		Responses		
		N	%	Percent of Cases
Reason why KRC was selected	Principles of the organization	1	8.3%	10.0%
	Expertise	4	33.3%	40.0%
	It is our mandate	1	8.3%	10.0%
	Calling for appeal	4	33.3%	40.0%
	Most effective	1	8.3%	10.0%
	Well-coordinated	1	8.3%	10.0%
Total		12	100.0%	120.0%

*Source***:** Research Data, 2014

In table 7 above, the government of Kenya official's response on why the Kenya Red-Cross Society was chosen to coordinate humanitarian assistance is as follows; expertise and calling for appeal at 33% each, its principles, effectiveness and coordination tied at 8.3%. Since its inception, red-cross society mandate has been that of responding to humanitarian crisis.

From the above responses on why the Red Cross society was chosen from both Red Cross officials and government officials, the responses agree with the fundamental principles of the Red Cross society which guides its operations in response to humanitarian crisis. The following are the principles (Red Cross Society, 2015):-

Humanity- the Red Cross movement aims at providing assistance to the vulnerable without discrimination to prevent and alleviate human suffering. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for human dignity. The movement also promotes mutual understanding and lasting cooperation among all people.

Impartiality- it makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavors to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress.

Neutrality- to earn the confidence of all, the movement takes no sides in hostilities nor does it engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.

Independence-the national societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subjects to the laws of their respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act in accordance with the principles of the movement.

Voluntary service- as a humanitarian organization, the Red Cross is a voluntary relief movement not prompted in any manner by desire for gain.

Unity- there can be only one Red Cross and one Red Crescent society in any one country. It must be open to all and carry on humanitarian work throughout its territory.

Universality- the international Red Cross and Red Crescent movement, in which all Societies have equal status and shares responsibilities and duties in helping each other, is worldwide.

On the issue of expertise, and well-coordination, the Kenya Red Cross society has a pull of volunteers well trained in first aid and disaster management in all areas of the country. It has eight regions and forty-two branches in the country (KRCS, 2015). The above are principles guiding the Red Cross Society in its work of providing humanitarian aid world-wide in availing humanitarian assistance to the victims of humanitarian crisis.

On measuring the government of Kenya fulfillment of its mandate to the IDPs by the KRCS, the responses revealed the following; positive fulfillment indicated that security was rated highly at 16.7% while full resettlement, mobilizing and sensitizing, and effective moral support indicate a positive rating of 8.3%. Additionally, the question on significant IDPs as having been resettled indicates the same percentage (8.3%). The trend on the negative fulfillment is almost the inverse of the positive fulfillment.

According to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Report, 6 December, 1999 states that, 'the protection and assistance to internally displaced persons is, first and foremost, the duty of national authorities'. The research stated by asking whether the state which delegated its authority to the Kenya Red Cross society fulfilled its mandate of responding to the plight of its displaced population.

On security a number of police stations have been rebuilt while in some areas, peace building efforts have been initiated (KHRC and National IDPs Network, 2011). The research noted that new police stations have been constructed to beef up security for instance; Burnt forest, Kesses, Yamumbi and Kiambaa.

On resettlement the research noted that though a significant number of IDPs have been resettled, there are still internally displaced persons in the camps. The figure below shows a picture of woman standings next to a water tank outside her newly constructed house in Rurigi, Burnt Forest.

There were other key notables on the negative fulfillments highlighted by KRCS on GOK fulfilling its mandate on IDPs such as poor financial facilitation and perception of self benefit while on duty. However, non- response from the field creates some marked differences as to the total percentages but the trend continues to portray the strengths as depicted in the positive fulfillment.

Table 9: Responses on Strategies employed by KRCS officials

		Responses		
				Percent of
		N	Percent	Cases
Strategies to address humanitarian crisis				
Grass root coordination		2	28.6%	50.0%
Training & recruiting experts		2	28.6%	50.0%
Emergency store		1	14.3%	25.0%
Putting equipped response kits		2	28.6%	50.0%
Total		7	100.0%	175.0%

***Source*:** Research Data, 2014

Of the respondents in table 9, a number of strategies were put in place by KRCS officials showing a multiple approach to the IDP crisis. The outcome in the table reveals that at 28.6%, grass root coordination, training and recruiting staff, and equipment and kits tie at use of common strategies. The least applicable strategy which rated at 14.3% was the use of emergency stores.

The research found that the Kenya Red Cross Society has a pull of volunteers in the region who are called when need arises to respond to the emergencies. However, it was observed that there was poor coordination of humanitarian assistance and efforts (Parliamentary Report on IDPs, 2012).

Table 10: Response on Assistance from GOK by KRCS

		Frequency	**Percent**	**Valid Percent**
Valid	No	1	10.0	11.1
	Yes	8	80.0	88.9
				100.0
Non- Response		1	10.0	
Total		10	100.0	

***Source*:** Research Data, 2014

From the above table, 8(80%) of the KRCS officials responded affirmatively that they received assistance from the government. This concurs with the KRCS preliminary appeal, Jan 2008 which states, "GoK issued for Ksh 957,127,906 to assist 500,000 IDPs for one (1) month". In addition, food and non-food items were donated by the government but distributed by the KRCS. In this table, 10% of those filling in the questionnaire asserted in the instrument that there was no assistance from the government while the remaining 10% of the respondent never responded.

However, as much as the government released money for IDPs, there were allegations by some IDPs that the Provincial Administrators, especially the DCs and DOs also embezzled funds meant for IDPs (PSC report on IDPs, 2012).

Table 11: Response on whether Assistance Was adequate

		Frequency	**Percent**	**Valid Percent**
Valid	No	1	10.0	16.7
	Yes	5	50.0	83.3
	Total	6	60.0	100.0
Missing	System	4	40.0	
Total		10	100.0	

***Source*:** Research Data, 2014

When the adequacy of assistance was questioned, the respondents, 5(50%) accepted that the assistance from the government was adequate, 1(10%) denied that the assistance was inadequate while 4(40%) never responded. This was a moving general positive affirmation of adequacy.

Table 12: Response on whether the strategy addressed the plight of IDPs

		Frequency	**Percent**	**Valid Percent**
Valid	Yes	8	80.0	88.9
	Partially	1	10.0	11.1
	Total	9	90.0	100.0
Missing	System	1	10.0	
Total		10	100.0	

***Source*:** Research Data, 2014

Of the respondents in table 12, as to whether the strategy addressed the plight of IDPs, eight (8) out of ten (10) agreed that the strategy employed by KRCS addressed the plight of IDPs, of these, 1 disagreed while another 1 did not respond. From the table, it can be concluded that to a larger extent the strategy employed by the KRCS succeeded in responding to humanitarian crisis. However, the KRCS is only responsible during emergencies/ during the period of hostilities and there after the mandate is fully responsible for its population.

The research found that as much as the as the results from the field shows the strategies succeeded, there are some victims of PEV who are still in camps under deplorable conditions.

6.2.1.1 Challenges facing KRCS

The research also endeavored to find out the challenges faced by the Kenya Red Cross Society in addressing humanitarian crisis of the internally displaced persons. In addressing this objective, the respondents were given an open ended questionnaire in which the findings were re-grouped and coded for the purposes of presentation and analyses which are shown in the table below.

Table 13: Challenges facing KRCS

	Responses		
			Percent of
	N	Percent	Cases
Challenges facing KRCS Insufficient funds	4	33.3%	44.4%
In genuine IDPs	5	41.7%	55.6%
Lack of political will	1	8.3%	11.1%
Poor road transport	1	8.3%	11.1%
Shortage of N.P.I.G	1	8.3%	11.1%
Total	12	100.0%	133.3%

Source: Research data, 2014

Of the respondents, 4(33.3%) cited that the challenge was insufficient funds, 5(41.7) ghost IDPs, lack of political will, poor road transport and shortage of N.P.I.G each had one response (8.7%).

From the respondents, the research concurs with the challenge that the funds were insufficient. It has been cited in this work that there was mismanagement of funds by the then provincial administration even though the allocation was inadequate.

6.2.1.2 Insufficient funds

This challenge is supported by the parliamentary report on IDPs which states that, "The National Humanitarian Fund for mitigation of effects and resettlement of victims of 2007 violence was allocated only Kshs.419.28 million in 2011/2012 which is not sufficient. The Committee felt that failure to implement and fully operationalize the Department of Mitigation and Resettlement and the National Humanitarian Fund for mitigation of effects and resettlement of victims of 2007 violence in the Ministry of Special Programmes were the main reason why the Government's response to the plight of IDPs was haphazard and unstructured".

6.2.1.3 Ghost IDPs

This problem originates from initial profiling of IDPs which was done by the then provincial administration which was blamed as having played a significant role in registering fake IDPs to the disadvantage of the genuine IDPs (Parliamentary Select Committee on IDPs, 2012). In most cases, the IDPs recommended the removal of District Commissioners (DCs), District Officers (Dos) and Chiefs in the vetting of IDPs (Kamungi and M.Kllop, 2008).

The researchers tends to differ with this issue in that seven years since the PEV there are still IDPs living in tents as observed. In the normal situations no one is willing to live in such conditions.

6.2.1.4 Lack of political will

This challenge is supported by the fact there are internally displaced persons who are still in camps seven years after PEV. Despite the enactment of the various policies to address the plight

of internally displaced population, the policies are just on papers. Even those accused of embezzlement of funds meant for resettlement and compensation have not yet been brought to book. If the government was serious about the issue the suspects could have been brought to book.

6.2.1.5 Poor road transport

The problem of transportation is supported Kenya Red Cross preliminary report of 2008 January which states that, "the KRCS will conduct e mergency distribution of relief items once the road network is accessible. This shows that there were other areas which were not assessable. This problem was the least and could have been prompted by the agency of delivering the assistance.

6.3 Way forward

The researchers endeavored to find out challenges that faced the KRCS in addressing the plight of Internally Displaced Persons.

6.3.1 Overcoming challenges

On overcoming the above challenges, most of the respondents from the Kenya Red Cross society officials opined that the government should be more responsive to take care of its population 4(57.1%), 2(28.6) said that identification process of Internally Displaced Persons should be fully done for adequate response, 1(14.3%) cited provision of adequate (Non Food Items) N.F.I.S.

Table 14: Showing response on overcoming challenges facing KRCS

		Responses		
		N	Percent	Percent of Cases
Overcoming Challenges				
	Govt care of people	4	57.1%	57.1%
	Full identity of the IDPs	2	28.6%	28.6%
	N.F.I.S Provision	1	14.3%	14.3%
Total		7	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Research Data, 2014

6.3.2 Reigning on government to take care of its population

Of the respondents, 57.1% were of the opinion that enough has not been done in addressing the plight of the displaced population. These sentiments are in line with the United Nations guiding principle on internal displacement which places the responsibility on the host state.

6.3.3 Full identification of IDPs

The profiling of internally displaced population was marred with corruption. In essence, no IDPs displaced before or after the violence of 2007 and 2008 have been profiled or registered on the national database (OHCHR, February 2012). Therefore, the profiling exercise should be done a fresh for proper response to be effected.

6.3.4 Provision of N.F.I.s

Of the respondents, 1 (8.7%) were of the opinion that the provision of Non-Food Items was a challenge. For instance, one family of six persons were distributed with one emergency relief kit consisting of; 2 Blankets, 1 Tarpaulin, 4 Soap bars, 2

Jerricans, 2 Mosquito nets (KCRS Appeal Report, 2008). Given the size of a family, the items distributed and the number of families affected, it was really a challenge.

The Government's response to the plight of IDPs in terms of provision of security, provision of relief food and non-food items and construction of temporal shelter for IDPs was largely haphazard and uncoordinated.

Conclusions
The role of KRCS can be enhanced through more financing and being allowed to perform its manadate with much independence from government.

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